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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL P. REAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID L. FITZEN,
Defendant and Appellant,
vs.
DAVID L. FITZEN,
Counterclaim Plaintiff
and Appellant,

Case No. 15220

VS.

PAUL REAM and BANK OF SALT LAKE,
Counterclaim Defendants
and Respondents,
REAM Is BARGAIN ANNEX NO. 2,
INCORPORATED, a Utah
corporation,

)
)

Defendant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE

~lATURE

OF THE CASE

The appellant David L. Fitzen has appealed from a judgment
of the District Court, Third Judicial District, the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, on a suit initiated by respondent
for an accounting in which the trial court determined that
respondent was liable to the appellant in the sum of $106.03 as a
result of a joint venture between the respondent and appellant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The respondent Daniel P. Ream, plaintiff below, filed suit
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District against the
defendant and appellant David L. Fitzen based upon a joint venture
activity of appellant and respondent.

The appellant, defendant

below, filed an answer and counterclaim against respondent Daniel P.
Ream and an impleader action against Paul Ream and the Bank of
Salt Lake bringing the impleader parties before the Court as
counterclaim defendants.

A reply was duly filed to the counter-

claim denying liability and an amended counterclaim and reply
were subsequently filed.

i'Jon-jury trial was held in the District

Court of Salt Lake County, Third Judicial District, before the
Honorable Stewart H. Hanson, Jr., Judge, and on January 18, 1977
Judge Hanson rendered a memorandum opinion and findings of fact
and judgment were duly entered dismissing the respondent Ream's
complaint against the appellant Fitzen and granting Fitzen judgment
on his counterclaim in the amount of $106.03.

The appellant

Fitzen has taken the appeal from that judgment.
STATEHENT OF FACTS
The complaint filed by Ream against Fitzen in the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, in October 1975, alleged
a joint venture agreement between Ream and Fitzen.

The agreement

was attached as Exhibit A to respondent's complaint and it is
undisputed that the agreement was executed by Fitzen and Ream on
the 7th day of October, 1974.

~he

agreement was a joint venture

agreement for the purchase of a 197!+ IJhi te truck to be used bv thP
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parties in a joint venture known as the Fitzen-Ream Equipment Company.
The joint venture agreement was supplemented on December 27, 1974,
to cover an additional equipment item, to-wit:

A Traxacavator.

The

joint venture agreement provided for a purchase price of the truck
of approximately $33,017.25 with a 86,000 down payment.

Daniel Ream

contributed $6,000 cash and Fitzen contributed $2,000 cash and a
truck bed set at a value of $4,000.

Paragraph 5 of the agreement

provided:
'~11 expenses of the joint venture, including
installment payments for said truck, repairs, and
alterations, all licenses, taxes, insurance, and
other expenses whatsoever in respect of the same,
allowance to the joint venturers for driving said
truck, and the wages of all persons employed in
the said business, and all other moneys which become
payable on the account of the said business and all
losses which shall happen in the same shall be paid
out of the capital of the partnership and/or the
profits arising therefrom, or, if the same shall
be deficient, by the joint ventures in equal shares."

Paragraph 7 of the agreement provided:
"It is agreed that David Fitzen is hereby
designated as managing joint venturer and is
given the sole direction and control of said
truck throughout the duration of this joint
venture.
(In all other matters, each of the
joint venturers shall have an equal interest
in the conduct of the affairs of the joint
venture.)"
The agreement also provided in Paragraph 11 that the parties
understood that appellant Fitzen conducted a demolition business
under the name of Bonneville Hrecking CoT!lpany.

The joint venture

\·las separate and apart from Bonneville Hrecking Company for the
purposes of the relationship between Ream and Fitzen.

Paragraph 11

Jf the joint venture agreement also provided that Bonneville Wrecking

l'nrnpany could "from time to time rent equipment from or otherwise
cuntracl with this joint venture."

Paragraph 12 of the joint

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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venture agreement provided for the keeping of books and accounts
and provided that the books would be kept at the principal place of
business in Salt Lake City.

A joint venture agreement '"as subse-

quently terminated and on August 11, 1975, Fitzen sent a letter to
Ream purporting to terminate the joint venture in accordance with
the terms of the agreement.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged a failure

on the part of the defendant Fitzen who kept the books to keep
adequate books and records and sought punitive damages, actual
damages, and a full and complete accounting.

The answer of Fitzen

acknowledged the agreement and counterclaimed alleging misconduct
on the part of respondent and asking the court for an accounting
of the respective liability and interests of the parties in the
joint venture.

Fitzen also joined Paul Ream and the Bank of Salt

Lake contending that a $6,000 lien that counterclaim defendant
Paul Ream had on the property of the joint venture should be
declared null and void.

An amended counterclaim was duly filed

challenging Paul Ream's lien in the sum of $6,000 on the truck
which was the subject of the joint venture.

The interest of the

Bank of Salt Lake was as the lender of funds necessary to purchase
the truck by appellant and respondent.
Fitzen testified that he did set up books for the venture
"after a fashion."

(Plaintiff's Abstract p. 1 ) .

A separate

checking account was set up in the name of Fitzen and Ream.
(Plaintiff's Abstract p. 1 ) .

Fitzen further testified that he

never set up a ledger for the joint venture and freouentlv jobs
on which the truck was used were bid in the name of Bonneville
Wrecking Company (Plaintiff's Abstract p. l

) and monies were put
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into the Bonneville Hrecking account on a regular basis rather
than the joint venture account.

(Plaintiff's Abstract p. 3 ) .

At the time of trial, appellant offered the testimony of
Gerald Ernest Deters, an accountant, retained to do a summary of
the Bonneville Hrecking account to ascertain what items of Bonneville
',)reeking and other receipts of transactions were attributable to
the Fitzen-Ream joint venture activity.

Deters testified that he

used the Fitzen-Ream checkbook in an effort to put together an
accounting or audit.

He based his accounting on information

supplied by Fitzen (Abstract p. 9-10) including figures supplied
by Fi tzen.

(Abstract p. 15 ) .

not made available.

All invoices and documents were

Exhibit 17F, being the accounting summary

that Fitzen offered to prove his claim, was admitted only for the
purposes of a showing and accounting but not for the truth of the
matter stated.

Respondent's objection to the substance of Fitzen's

accounting was sustained.

It appeared that Fitzen regularly used

the Bonneville Wrecking account and the Ream-Fitzen account for
his own business interests in Bonneville l-Jrecking.

(Abstract p. 3=Li).

Exhibits 18 through 23 being the underlying documents upon which
Deter's reconstruction of the obligations between Fitzen and Ream
were not received by the court except for illustrative purposes
and the court indicated that if the trial were a jury trial an
objection raised by respondent on the basis of hearsay would be
sustained.

(Abstract p. 53).

Based upon the evidence before the

court, Judge Hanson entered his memorandum decision setting the
2ccounting between the parties as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff
$13,000.00
none
2,807.50
$15,507.50

Capitol Contribution
Expenses Advanced
Labor Advanced
Less Rent Due From Defendant
DBA Bonneville Hrecking For
Equipment (Truck & Cat).
Plaintiff's Draws
Cash Received by Plaintiff
Provo Store
Damaged Car (Advanced by Defendant)
Advance or Loan by Plaintiff
Through Mother

Defendant
$13,000.00
26,921.53
None
$39,921.53
22,483.00
$17,438.53
1,000.00
385.00
350.00
250.00

3,500.00
$19,307.50

$19,413.53

Judge Hanson further found that each of the parties contributed
$13,000 towards the joint venture, some in cash and some in
equipment.

He found that Fitzen was the managing partner of the

joint venture and carried most of the income and expenses of the
joint venture by himself or his company Bonneville Hrecking.

The

court found "that [Fitzen] did not keep a proper and exact accounting
with respect to the income and expenses."

The court further found

in Paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact that Daniel Ream worked
for the joint venture and that the joint venture as a result owed
Daniel Ream $2,807.50.

The court found that Fitzen used the

truck and tractor of the joint venture in connection with Fitzen's
business as Bonneville Hrecking Company and owed the joint venture
the sum of $22,483.00 for the rental of the equipment.
Fact, 5).

(Findings of

The court found that Fitzen had ratified the securitv

interest of Paul Ream in the loan of the money to obtain the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tractor (Findings of Fact , 6) and that Fitzen had not met his
burden of proof or persuasion as to claimed loss or damage to the
tractor or other claimed losses or that the claims were unrelated
to rent to Bonneville Wrecking.

(Findings of Fact

~Ill

7 and 8).

Based upon the Findings of Fact, the court entered judgment for
the defendant Fitzen on Fitzen's counterclaim.
POil~T

I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CHARGING THE DEFENDANT FITZEc·l
HITH RENT NOR IN FAILING TO CREDIT FITZEll TrJITH FUNDS DEPOSITED
IN THE JOINT VENTURE ACCOUNT.
The instant action filed by respondent Daniel P. Ream was
for an accounting from the managing partner, David L. Fitzen.
Punitive damages were sought in the action but not pursued or
awarded.

The counterclaim of the defendant was a claim for

offsets and consequently the action was an accounting action with
a resulting judgment based upon accounts which could be reconstructed.
Although the action is equitable in nature, the findings of the
trial court are entitled to substantial and special consideration.

In Bear River State Bank v. Merrill, 101 Utah 176, 120 P.2d 325
(1941), an action was filed by plaintiffs against defendants,
former officers and directors of a bank, for conversion and for
an accounting.

This Court stated:

"The findings of the trial court will not be
upset.
This court recognizes the fact that the
trial court saw the \.Jitnesses, observed their
demeanor and was in a better position to judge
their cr~dibility than is an appellate court with
only the transcript as a basis for its conclusions.
It is the duty of this court to review and weigh
the evidence in an action for legal and equitable
relief and the findings of the trial court are not
disturbed unless wrong. Rich v. Ste~hens, 79 Utah
4ll, ll P.2d 295; Smith v. Edwards,
1 Utah 244,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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17 P.2d 264. And where it is claimed that the
facts found by the trial court are not supported by
the evidence the appellants are entitled to a full
review of the evidence and a determination by the
Supreme Court. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 43 P.2d
513, 101 A.L.R. 532; Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526
46 P.2d 674. However, findings based upon conflicting'
testimony such as is presented in the instant case,
will not be disturbed unless it appears that the trial
court has misapplied proven facts or that the findings
are clearly against the weight of the evidence."
Recently, in Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), the
Court observed:
"Even though it is true, as plaintiffs advocate:
that the attempt to reform a deed is a proceeding in
equity in which the court may review the facts, it is
nevertheless well established that because of the
advantaged position of the trial court, we give
considerable deference to his findings and judgment."
And, in Elias v. Lea,

P.2d

(Utah 1978), in an equity proceeding

the Court observed:
"The appellants urge us to overlook the finding
of the trial court who saw and heard the witnesses
and render our own findings at variance therewith.
They urge us to do so because of the provisions of
Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution
which so far as material, reads as follows:
. . . In equity cases the appeal may
be on questions of both law and fact; in
cases at law the appeal shall be on questions
of law alone.
At the time the Constitution was adopted, equity
matters were submitted on depositions; therefore,
members of the Supreme Court were just as capable
of determining the facts in an equity case as was
the trial judge. By our court decision we have
continued to consider the facts of an equity case
on appeal, but we do not substitute our judgment
of what the facts are unless the ruling of the court
below is clearly against the weight of the evidence."
Consequently, there is no basis for overturning the trial court's
judgment unless the facts found by the trial judge are clearlv
unsupported by the evidence or the judgment legally erroneous.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In an accounting action it is incumbent upon the party
against whom the accounting is sought to provide as full and
accurate a picture of the status of the account as is possible.
The burden in this case is therefore upon Fitzen.

In Dunn v.

Baugh, 506 P.2d 463 (Idaho 1973), the court stated:
"Baugh, as the party called upon to render
an accounting, had both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion."
Fitzen's accounting (Exhibit 17F) was not admitted into evidence
for anything other than the fact of accounting, as distinct from
the truth of the matters asserted, and the underlying documents
which Fitzen used to support his accounting were also deemed
hearsay.

Thus, the only significant evidence Fitzen presented

on the accounting was not received for the truth of the matter
asserted and therefore did not establish Fitzen's contentions as
to the status of the relationship between the parties.

Fitzen

simply did not account even though he was the managing party in
the joint venture.

He had the records and the accounts and

comingled the activities of the Ream-Fitzen joint venture with
those of Bonneville Wrecking, his own personal business.
unable to render an accurate accounting.

He was

In Simper v. Scorup, 78

Utah 71, 1 P.2d 941 (1931), this Court said with reference to the
burden on a party in an accounting action:
"From the accounting rendered by Scorup and
from the bank statements upon which his accounting
is wholly based, we do not see how any even
reasonably accurate result may be reached as to
the value of the relative interests of the parties
at the time of the fire.
The accounting rendered
by him was a mere general statement or accounting
with no explanation given of it other than as
stated.
In a suit in accounting in equity the
burden of proof is upon the defendant to account
for all money or property of the plaintiff that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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has come into his hands. He has the burden of
showing that he is entitled to credit for moneys
charged in his account or as having been paid by
him to or for the use of the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff does not have the burden of showing that
the items charged were improper or that the
defendant was not entitled thereto.
The defendant
as the trustee of the plaintiff was required to
show that he had performed his trust and the
manner of its performance. He owed that duty
because of his confidential relation and because
he is presumed to know how he performed his duty."
Fitzen did not carry forward his legal duty.

His testimony given

as to the status of the accounts was that he had no personal
information, commingled the accounts, failed to keep adequate
records and vouchers, and was unable to present any reasonable
evidence to justify his claim for relief.
accounts "after a fashion".

He set up records and

Fitzen does not in this appeal,

contend the trial court erred in not receiving his accounting
into evidence.

Therefore, his exhibits are not properly considered

for purposes of this appeal.

A joint venture is a business

association distinguishable from a partnership only by the narrowness
of its purpose.

Otherwise the legal relationship is similar to a

partnership arrangement.
p. 189.

Crane

& Bromberg,

Law of Partnership,

Fitzen used the joint venture equipment in conjunction

with Fitzen's personal business activities.

Under the term of the

joint venture agreement, he was chargeable for the reasonable
rental for the equipment use.

Whether any sum was ever received

by the joint venture from the rental of the equipment is not
material.
Fitzen.

The fact is the value of the rental is chargeable to
There is sufficient evidence in the record as pointed

out in appellant's own brief to establish a rental figure for
Fitzen's use of the joint venture property in conjunction with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his own Bonneville Wrecking business.

The accounting information

the court relied upon was based upon information presented by the
respondent Dan Ream not rebutted by Fitzen.
accepted the evidence of Daniel Ream.

The trial court

In addition, Fitzen was

unable to establish the right to have the Ream-Fitzen account
figures credited to the joint venture since he was unaware of
just what monies were deposited in the account and how they were
disbursed.

He was unable to allocate funds to transactions.

He simply did not meet his burden of proof with reference to the
accounting.

With reference to alleged losses occasioned by Ream's

efforts on various projects no evidence was presented which would
establish any special culpability on his part such that he was
legally chargeable for any special losses.

In the absence of

fraud, culpable negligence, or bad faith as to acts performed by
Ream, the joint venture had to bear the loss and Fitzen was
entitled to no credit for those matters.
§ 97.

68 C.J.S. Partnership,

Further, the trial court found that as to such special

claims that Fitzen had not carried his burden of proof.

Although

the joint venture agreement contemplated that Fitzen would rent
the joint venture equipment and in fact Fitzen admittedly used
the equipment and kept the books this did not excuse him from
keeping accurate accounts.

Fitzen was still required to exercise

honest, accurate and forthright method of accounting.

The obser-

vations of Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) are applicable in this case.

It was

observed there:
"Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe
to one another . . . the duty of finest loyalty.
nany furms of conduct permissible in a workaday
for Law
those
acting
at arm's
length,
are and Library Services
Sponsoredworld
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by the
Institute of Museum
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. !lot honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that
is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule
of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating
erosion' of particular exceptions . . . Only
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd.
It will not consciously be
lowered by any judgment of this court."
In Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893), it was observed

wi~

reference to the accountability of a partner:
"It is 'well settled that one partner cannot,
directly or indirectly, use partnership assets
for his own benefit; that he cannot in conducting
the business of a partnership, take any profit
clandestinely for himself; that he cannot carry
on the business of the partnership for his
private advantage; that he cannot carry on another
business in competition or rivalry with that of the
firm, thereby depriving it of the benefit of his
time, skill, and fidelity, without being accountable
to his copartners for any profit that may accrue
to him therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to
secure for himself that which it is his duty to
obyain, if at all, for the firm of which he is a
member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge or
information which may be properly regarded as the
property of the partnership, in the sense that
it is available or useful to the firm for any
purpose within the scope of the partnership
business."
Fitzen simply did not carry his burden of proof in the trial
court by showing that he was entitled to any benefits other than
accorded him by the trial judge.

His proffers of proof were

either inadmissible or did not establish contentions he now seeks
to support on appeal.

The trial court had the advantage of observf

the witnesses and of being able to judge their credibility.

lie

simply accepted the evidence that appeared reasonable and rejected
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the exhibits and testimony that was speculative.

Fitzen's evidence

as seen from respondent's abstract was speculative, inexact, and
hypothetical.

There is believable evidence to support the

rental figure the trial court imposed on Fitzen, the other figures
adopted by the trial court, as well as justification for not
affording Fitzen any additional credits.

In Tanner v. Utah Poultry

& Farmers Cooperative, 15 Utah 2d 145, 389 P.2d 62 (1964), this
Court had before it an accounting action involving some 1200
pages of record.

The court affirmed the trial court finding

adverse to the appellant noting:
"The points made on appeal, asserting in substance
that the trial court erred in its findings, are not
supported by the evidence or any conclusion that
the trial court acted arbitrarily. We believe
and hold that the court properly, reasonably and
justifiably arrived at its conclusion, and that
there is no meritorious reason why this court
should burden the reader with any detailed canvass
of either the testimony or the exhibits proffered."
This case warrants a similar result.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE $6,000 LIEN ON JOINT
VENTURE PROPERTY TO PAUL REAH HAS KNOWN AND RATIFIED BY
FITZEN PRIOR TO THE SECURITY INTEREST ATTACHED IS SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD AND NOT CONTRAVENED BY THE ABSTRACT ON APPEAL.
The facts supporting the finding No. 6 of the trial court as
to ratification by Fitzen of the lien in favor of Paul Ream and
Bank of Salt Lake on joint venture property is fully supported by
the record.

The brief of the Bank of Salt Lake City adequately

covers this issue.

Further, the abstract of the record prepared

by appellant pursuant to Rule 75E does not set forth a sufficient

factual basis justifying this court on appeal from concluding that
the tri a1 court's finding \vas correct.

Therefore, it must be assu.r'led
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that the finding of the trial court was supported by the evidence.
Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P. 2d 154 (1963).
POINT III
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REDUCE DAN REAM'S
EQUITY BY THE AMOUNT OF THE $6,000 LIEN OF PAUL REA:'I1
SINCE THE LIEN WAS RATIFIED BY APPELLANT AND WAS OHLY
A SECURITY INTEREST APPLICABLE TO THE ASSETS OF THE
JOINT VENTURE IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT.
The appellant Fitzen contends that if the lien on the joint
venture equipment is valid that there should be a $6,000 reduction
(amount of lien) in Dan Ream's equity in the joint venture.

The

accounting action was to resolve the interests between the parties
in relation to the joint venture.

Fitzen ratified the security

interest of Paul Ream and the Bank of Salt Lake.

Appellant's

abstract of the record does not provide a basis for a conclusion
contrary to that finding of the trial court that ratification
occurred before the security interest attached.

Consequently,

the contribution of Ream was accepted by Fitzen subject to the
security interest.

The security interest became operable between

the parties, ?OA-9-201, U.C.A. 1953.

It defeated the joint

venture's interest in the full value of the asset only upon
default, ?OA-9-501, U.C.A., 1953.

Upon the lien becoming operable

in favor of the secured creditor the assets of the joint venture
would be reduced, but the original contribution of the parties
to the joint venture would not be effected.

Thus at the time of

the joint venture the contribution of Ream was the face value of
the asset, $6,000, and in an accounting he would be entitled to
credit for his contribution.

Any loss, and no loss has as vet been

shown, is the loss of the joint venture and not of consequence in
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an accounting between the parties.
speculative.

Further, any loss is at best

Such a determination would be purely speculative,

dependent upon matters outside the record of this case.

Therefore,

it was proper to accord Daniel Ream the value of his initial
contribution in an accounting between Ream and Fitzen and Fitzen
is not entitled to a credit for the lien.
The respondent further submits that the position taken on this
point by the appellant is not shown in the record to have been raised
in the court below and therefore was not property preserved on appeal.
First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887
(Utah 1975); Hamilton v. Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P.2d
235 (1964)

0

POlin IV
APPELLANT'S ABSTRACT OF THE RECORD PURSUANT TO RULE 75(e)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A REVIEW OF APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL.
This Court directed that in view of the length of the record
that an abstract be prepared pursuant to Rule 75(e) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The abstract as prepared by the appellant in

support of appellant's contentions is not sufficient for review
by this Court of the issues asserted by the appellant on appeal.

The abstract does not present evidence sufficient to warrant the
relief granted.

An abstract should present to the appellate

court an accurate and authentic history of all proceedings in the
trial below and a correct and sufficient summary of >vhat transpired.
Brown v. Reichmann, 237 '1o. App. 136, 164 S.vJ.2d 201 (1942).
There the abstract does not support the appellant's contentions
it will not justify an appellate court in according the relief

requested.

!larding v. Bedoll, 202 '1o

625, 100 S.H. 638 (1907).
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Consequently, this court should follow its prior rulings and
presume the findings of the trial court to be supported by
admissible, competent and substantial evidence and affirm the
judgment.

Watkins v. Simonds, supra; Sayeers v. Sayeers, 558

P.2d 607 (1976); Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 542 P.2d 183 (Utah
1975);

Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 155, 193 P. 1093, 15

A.L.R. 620 (1920); In re Voorhees Est., 12 Utah 2d 361, 366, 366
P.2d 977 (1961); James Mfg. Co. v. Hilson, 15 Utah 2d 210, 213,
390 P.2d 127 (1964); Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 212 Utah 359, 242
P.2d 297 (1952); Felter v. Felter,

p. 2d.

(Utah, February

22' 1978).
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that there is ample basis in the
record before this court to warrant this court in concluding that
the findings and judgment of the trial court were legally sufficient
and should be affirmed.
the trial court.

The appellant did not carry its burden in

The facts which the trial court found supportable

by the evidence, the record on appeal does not justify departing
from the trial court's findings of fact which were based upon the
court's perogatives and advantaged position.

This Court should

affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

\HLLIAH J. CAYIAS
1558 South 11th East
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 85105
Attorney for Respondent
Daniel P. Ream
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